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Elders in the Workforce:
Advantages and Disadvantages
Of Staying on the Job
Is it wise to encourage older employees
to delay retirement? Some statistics say
yes. While there are benefits to contin-
uing to work, however, there are also
financial consequences. This article
discusses the advantages and drawbacks
of staying in the workforce beyond the
age of sixty-five.
By Monica Pikoske
Monica Pikoske obtained her undergraduate degree
from the University of Wisconsin Madison in 1995,
with a double major in political science and African-
American studies. She will receive her degree in law
from Marquette University Law School in 2003.
t the end of the day, most Americans
are left with feelings of accomplish-
ment, self-satisfaction, and integrity.
This stems from the ability to achieve
and maintain gainful employment. At
the end of many days and years, however, people
feel entitled to reap the benefits of their hard-
earned retirements. The current Social Security sys-
tem, tax structures, and pension plans allow people
to do this. However, the workforce is changing-
and so are the considerations for remaining in or
reentering the workplace.
Take, for example, my own parents: My father,
aged sixty-one, retired early from engineering at
the age of fifty-six to spend more time working on
his hobbies. However, he has recently embarked on
a second career in the postal carrier service.
Similarly, my mother, aged sixty-six, left full-time
teaching thirty years ago in order to raise three
children. She has recently returned to teaching as a
substitute. When asked their reasons, both my
mother and my father cite minor financial rewards,
but much of their motivation is linked to sociolog-
ical benefits: They truly appreciate being physical-
ly and mentally able to contribute to the needs of
their small community.
While I first thought my parents were unique in
their post-retirement careers, I now realize that
there is a growing need to encourage older employ-
ees to remain in or reenter the workforce, and my
parents are unknowingly trendsetters in their time.
However, there are also significant barriers that
need to be addressed before the fifty-plus employ-
ee decides that continued employment is much
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more attractive than a retirement full of leisure
activities.
The workforce is getting older as the Baby
Boomers reach retirement age, the younger gen-
erations are not replenishing these numbers, and
Social Security is scheduled to run out of funds
somewhere around the year 2035.1 So while sta-
tistics indicate that it would be wise to encourage
older employees to delay retirement, there remain
financial consequences to those who do; but
there are also financial benefits for older employ-
ees who continue to work.
Why It Is Necessary
To Rethink Our Workforce
Recently policymakers, employers, and academics
alike have been debating how to address the prob-
lems of a shrinking labor force and a decreasing
Social Security trust fund. Because it accounts for
five percent of the Gross National Product, and
that figure is expected to rise in the next few years,
Social Security is the primary target for reform.2
In addition, the present structure of Social Security
is in jeopardy of going bankrupt.
In order to appreciate the necessity for reform,
one must first understand the rapid rate at which
the labor force is aging. The gradual shift in the
demographics of the labor force is increasing the
strain on the Social Security system. Since the
birth of the Baby Boomers, the pool of employees
supporting retirees has diminished.
In 1950, the ratio of workers to retirees was
16.5 to 1. This means the taxes of 16.5
workers were paying the Social Security
benefits of one retiree. Currently, about 3.4
workers support each retiree. By 2030, just
2 workers will have to support each retiree.3
This trend indicates that with a reduction in
the number of employees available to support
each retiree, some changes are required. Social
Security benefits will either need to be decreased,
or the amount of income taxes that go to sup-
porting current levels of Social Security will have
to increase to around fifty percent of wages. 4 In
addition, the disparity among the populations of
each generation is worsening.
Between now and the year 2030 the per-
centage of people over age sixty-five in our
population will double to a quarter of the
population, equal to the number of people
ages twenty to thirty-five. Older Americans
will live longer. In 1900 the life expectancy
of a child at birth was forty-nine; it is now
seventy-six, a bigger spurt than in the prior
5,000 years. Our youthful population, on
the other hand, is not even reproducing
itself. We are fast becoming a middle-aged
society.5
Not only is the large population concentrated
in the Baby Boomers demanding to our current
system, there appears to be little hope for the
subsequent generations to alleviate the problem
by producing a larger pool of laborers. These
demographics warn that our current system will
be overloaded too quickly unless we start to
address the growing need.
Next, one must understand the nature of the
Social Security redistribution system and how,
under current laws, the system will go bankrupt
in a few decades. The pay-as-you-go system takes
withholdings from one generation of employees
and redistributes it to the retirees of the preced-
ing generation.6 The amount of benefits a retired
worker is entitled to depend directly on the
amount of contributions he or she has made over
the years. 7 A mathematical formula is used to
help determine the benefit for each retiree.
For a typical retired worker, the process of
computing the AIME (average indexed
monthly earnings) starts by identifying all of
the years in which that worker had covered
earnings and determining the amount of
earnings in those years. Indexing for infla-
tion is used to make earnings from early in
the worker's career comparable to earnings
in later years. Up to five years of low earn-
ings are excluded. Then the highest thirty-
five years of indexed earnings are selected
and totaled. This total indexed earnings fig-
ure is then divided by thirty-five years to get
an average indexed annual earnings figure.8
Because these benefits are paid by the current
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contributions of younger workers, however, as
the number of retirees multiplies and their life
expectancies grow, a reduced labor force will be
increasingly taxed to maintain the promised levels
of benefits. Eventually, the smaller labor force will
be unable to support this current system.
Incentives to Remain in the Workforce
The Social Security system currently contains
incentives that encourage elderly employees to
remain in the workforce. These are intended to
help alleviate some of the pending shortages in the
system.
The first incentive is inherent in the calculation
of AIME. 9 Second, there is a delayed retirement
credit for employees who continue to work after
the age of sixty-five. 10 In addition, there are par-
ticular tax provisions that exclude Social Security
benefits from taxable income. 1 1 These combined
features provide a modest incentive to an older
worker to remain in his or her current employ-
ment, provided that he or she is willing and able.
Currently, Social Security benefits are paid out
based on the amount of contributions made during
years of employment. It would follow that employ-
ees would want to maximize those contributions
while they are still employed, enabling each retiree
to achieve the highest possible payout upon retire-
ment. 12 Because the AIME excludes lower earning
years, an older worker who has a greater likelihood
of earning higher wages would thus be able to earn
higher benefits upon retirement by staying in the
workforce at that higher rate of pay.13
Similarly, the Social Security system encourages
delayed retirement in two ways: It allows for early
collection of benefits but at a lower rate, 14 and it
provides a credit if the employee delays retirement
and application for benefits. 15 Older employees
can opt to retire at the age of sixty-two and start
collecting Social Security benefits under the Earliest
Eligibility Age provision.16 However, just as bene-
fits are indexed in accordance with inflation, bene-
fits collected before the age of sixty-five are actuar-
ially reduced to around eighty percent of the regu-
lar monthly payment.17 This reduction is appro-
priate, considering that the amount of benefit is
essentially fixed upon retirement.
Someone who wishes to draw on those benefits
early must be prepared to receive a smaller payment
each month than someone who retires at age sixty-
five. 18 In terms of motivating workers to stay in the
labor market, some studies suggest that greater ben-
efits under Social Security play only a minor role in
a person's decision to leave the workforce.19
On the other hand, it appears that the delayed
retirement credit, under 42 U.S.C. S 402(w), is a
more persuasive provision because it awards a flat
percentage increase to people who put off retiring.
The delayed retirement credit increases the
monthly benefit to be paid to a worker who
delays receipt of benefits until after normal
retirement age because that worker has not
filed an application for benefits or was work-
ing. The delayed retirement credit [was] five
percent per year for workers aged sixty-five in
1997 and 1998 and will increase by one-half
of one percent in 1999 and every other year
thereafter until it reaches an actuarially fair
eight percent in 2008.20
This is a nice option for workers who have
already made the decision not to retire early, and
gives an added encouragement to stay past the age
of sixty-five. The delayed retirement credit is most
appropriate in cases where the older employee has
the desire and physical capability to remain at his
or her job; however, it needs to be emphasized once
again that financial rewards are only part of the
decision to stay in the workforce. 2 1
The final incentive for continuing employment
after the age of sixty-five involves federal tax struc-
tures that reward this choice. Specifically, a certain
percentage of Social Security benefits are not taxed
as income.
Most of the Social Security benefits received
by elderly individuals are excluded from gross
income because of a special tax provision. The
actual amount of a beneficiary's Social
Security benefits to be included in gross
income is determined by applying a compli-
cated two-tier formula. Basically, single tax-
payers with incomes over $25,000, and mar-
ried couples with incomes over $32,000, must
include as much as half of their Social Security
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benefits in income. 22
This amounts to significant portions of a retired
person's income being tax-free. A related provision
allows employees to remain in the workforce and
receive income and also receive Social Security ben-
efits as long as they do not earn over a certain dol-
lar amount reach year. For 2000, the amount was
$25,000 per year that would not affect the Social
Security benefit.23 In addition, there is a standard
deduction for persons over the age of sixty-five
regardless of the person's employment status. 24
This, combined with other general tax provisions
that directly and indirectly benefit the elderly, help
support their decision to continue working past the
age of sixty-five.
Disincentives for Remaining
In the Workforce
Although there are some financial incentives to
delaying retirement, there appear to be more dis-
incentives to postponing that decision. We have
lived in a society that assumed age sixty-five is
the appropriate age for retirement for far too
long without considering changing it.2 5 Now this
age is entrenched in many government programs
to the extent that if people want to remain active
in employment after that, they are subjected to
Social Security penalties, tax consequences, and
even pension restrictions.
Even though Social Security appears to encour-
age working until sixty-five and beyond, there
are some provisions that can actually penalize
people for deciding to do so. For instance, the
retirement earnings test provides that an older
employee can lose benefits if he or she decides to
continue working after starting to receive Social
Security benefits. 26
In 1998, the retirement earnings test
allowed workers under age sixty-five to earn
up to $9,120 a year in wages or self-employ-
ment income without affecting their bene-
fits. For earnings beyond that amount, one
dollar of benefits was lost for every two dol-
lars of earnings. 2 7
Although this is not a critical amount of
money lost over time, the income amount stipu-
lated in the statute is minimal, and most employ-
ees, even part-time, would easily exceed it.
Similar to the incentives to working past the age
of sixty-five, the AIME calculation formula can
also serve as a deterrent to delaying retirement.
Because no more than thirty-five years of
earnings are used to compute average indexed
monthly earnings, working another year often
pushes out a prior year for which the worker
had previously made Social Security tax "con-
tributions." 28
In other words, someone who has worked more
than the required thirty years would have little or
no reason to continue to work because the employ-
ee's contributions of that extra year would not
directly increase his or her own benefit. This is typ-
ical of the Social Security system that takes money
from one generation to pay the retirement of
another. Plus, there is a strong sentiment of feeling
entitled to those hard-earned benefits.29
Another incentive that can serve as a limitation
is the delayed retirement credit. Although this
allows for an increased benefit, it is merely five per-
cent.30 This amount of reward is too low.
For many workers, this inadequately compen-
sates for a year of foregone benefits. The
delayed retirement credit will increase gradual-
ly to an actuarially fair eight percent in 2008.
Until then, Social Security discourages work
after age sixty-five. Not surprisingly, more than
half of new beneficiaries claim their benefits as
soon as they can-at age sixty-two--and fully
seventy-two percent of new beneficiaries claim
them before age sixty-five. 31
These numbers represent how strong these pro-
visions actually work against retaining elderly
employees.
These Social Security provisions, combined
with certain tax consequences, urge retirement at
the "normal" age. As stated earlier, a large por-
tion of Social Security benefits are free from
taxes. However, for single persons earning over
$34,000 in 1995, federal tax laws required tax
on eighty-five percent of Social Security benefits
4343
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as income.32 Although the salary requirement is
considerable for those who remain in high-pay-
ing jobs or have the same job for years, this
salary requirement is easily satisfied. For those
who continue to work, under certain require-
ments, they could pay on numerous levels for
that decision. First of all, the income is taxed if
the employee receives Social Security benefits.
Second, portions of those Social Security benefits
are taxed.
Further, the employee must continue to con-
tribute to the Social Security system. These layers
of taxes become too burdensome, and the subse-
quent income is not worth the effort for many eld-
erly employees. 33
Finally, some employers are punishing elderly
employees for remaining in or reentering the work-
force by placing restrictions on pension plans. For
example, Kansas has recently implemented a pro-
gram for its public employees called the Kansas
Public Employee Retirement System. 34 This pro-
gram applies to public employees, school employ-
ees, peace officers, firefighters, and judges. 35
[Rietirees who reemploy with an employer
in the same subsystem may keep full pension
benefits while earning their new salary,
unless the post-retirement employer is the
same employer from which the member
retired. When returning to employment with
the same employer that the employee
worked for in the final two years before
retirement, the retiree faces earnings limita-
tions.3 6
The system is based on the premise that every
state has some form of pension limitation for cer-
tain retirees who remain in or reenter the work-
force.37 Although public-sector workers typically
have generous benefits, this pension restriction,
combined with the Social Security penalties and
tax consequences, does not leave public employ-
ees over the age of sixty-five with much of an
incentive to continue working.
Possible Solutions
Although the shrinking labor force and the grow-
ing number of expected retirees threatens to
deplete our Social Security program entirely, the
benefit should not be eliminated. Social Security is
widely recognized for protecting our retirees from
impoverishment and statistics support this. For
example,
[t]hirty years ago, almost 30% of the elderly
were in poverty, a poverty rate that was more
than twice as high as the rate for the popula-
tion as a whole. Today, in contrast, only about
12% of the elderly are subject to poverty, a
rate that is about the same as the rest of the
adult population.3 8
This change is significant because of the broad
scope of the Social Security system. It currently
covers over ninety-five percent of the labor pool,
and no other government program is as exten-
sive.3 9 Because of this, a large portion of the
retiring workforce relies solely on Social Security
benefits for retirement. As one scholar noted,
"six out of ten private-sector workers of retire-
ment age have no private pensions to fall back
on, and less than half of all private workers are
currently earning pension credits." 40 Therefore,
it is imperative that this system be reformed so
that it can continue to provide for our growing
number of retirees, and one way to do this is to
encourage older workers to remain employed.
Some policymakers suggest reforms to the
existing Social Security program, while others
maintain privatizing or partially privatizing
Social Security is an even better approach.
Regardless, Senator Nickles suggests some very
significant policy considerations to be addressed
when implementing reforms: "Allow for the
change to be voluntary, ...provide for the highest
possible return for workers, ...make the system
self-sustaining, ...[and] require no increase in
taxes in order to fund the change." 4 1 The debate
over reforming Social Security is bound to be an
endless political foray, but remaining focused on
those who have the most to lose in these reforms
might help develop the best solution.
Those who recommend reforming the existing
Social Security program suggest a myriad of
reforms including raising the retirement ages,
extending the benefit computation period, chang-
ing tax consequences, eliminating the retirement
earnings test, raising the delayed retirement cred-
44
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it, and even converting Social Security into indi-
vidual retirement accounts. 4 2 The most contro-
versial of these suggestions is raising the retire-
ment age. Although it is not disputed that the age
of sixty-five was arbitrarily chosen as the appro-
priate age to retire, this was done at a time when
life expectancies were much shorter and age-
related infirmities were much more prevalent. 4 3
No adjustment to this age has been considered
even though people are living longer, they are in
better health, and they are physically and men-
tally able to continue working. 44 The best argu-
ment for raising the retirement age is that it
would require employees to remain in the work-
force. The earliest eligibility age would necessar-
ily need to be increased as well, or the incentive
would be lost.45
Other proposed Social Security reforms pro-
vide less rigid motivations. If the benefit compu-
tation period were extended, the AIME would
naturally rise. Because employees could still
exclude the lowest-earning five years, they would
have greater incentive to stay at the higher-pay-
ing jobs many of them hold in their later years.4 6
By capping the period at thirty-five years, there is
little motivation to go past the required number
of years.This deterrent could be offset by provid-
ing a direct benefit of an increased monthly pay-
ment. Likewise, eliminating the restriction under
the retirement earnings test would also inspire
more elderly employees to stay employed.4 7
Increasing the amount offered in the delayed
retirement credit would have a similar effect.4 8
Finally, removing some of the tax consequences
such as increasing the amount of benefits that are
tax-free would provide additional enticements. 4 9
All these reforms are relatively minor and require
little in terms of legislative effort, but represent
some major relief to the overloaded system.
A rather creative solution involves converting
Social Security benefits into individual retirement
savings accounts. Jonathan Barry Forman states:
[p]roponents of complete or partial privati-
zation of Social Security typically call for
replacing all or a portion of the current sys-
tem with a system of individual retirement
savings accounts that would invest in the
stock market. All or a portion of the Social
Security taxes that workers now pay to the
federal government would go instead into
IRSAs which would operate much like
today's Individual Retirement Accounts.5 0
Although Forman agrees with this approach,
he suggests that the individual retirement
accounts be handled and invested by the govern-
ment. 5 1 This reduces some of the risk involved in
transitioning over to a completely privatized
industry, and transforms the redistribution sys-
tem to a direct benefit system where an employ-
ee's tax contributions go directly to him or her
upon retirement. It also allows for a greater
return on an employee's contributions.
Others recommend privatizing the retirement
benefit program based on the success of similar
programs in other areas of the world. 52 Some of
the benefits of privatization include: higher rates
of return, reduced government liability, creation
of a self-sustaining system, disconnection of ben-
efits from length of life, and better benefits for
lower-income workers.5 3 An indirect benefit is
greater economic growth due to the larger
amounts of private investment. 54 In addition,
keeping elderly employees in the workforce
would help alleviate the demographic problems
with the redistribution scheme of Social Security.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, each of the solutions being offered
comes with a downside and considerable risks.
However, these risks do not justify ignoring this
problem.
There are currently incentives to those who
want to remain in the workforce, but they have
shortcomings, and the financial consequences far
outweigh the incentives. Also, financial consider-
ations are not the only reasons for deciding to
retire. Many people do weigh the financial costs
and benefits, but the decision to retire encom-
passes many other non-fiscal issues. Therefore,
financial rewards alone are not sufficient to
change the collective minds of the Baby Boomers.
Retirees want change. They want more free-
dom and less accountability. They have been con-
tributing to the Social Security Trust Fund for
years, and want and deserve their fair share.
4545
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Stronger financial incentives are a step in the
right direction, but the true solution will embrace
the proper balance of monetary rewards and soci-
ological benefits.
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